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Abstract
One factor which contributes to the difficulty that a reader may encounter
in reading a text is the syntactic complexity of the constructions used
in the text. This report focuses on one particular type of sentence struc-
ture which would be difficult to process, according to most measures of
complexity. This construction type also poses a problem for linguistic
theory, because it is hard to describe adequately in terms of syntactic
transformations. The problem is that the transformations in question, which
relate variant sentence forms within the construction type, appear to have
conditions on them which are complex, variable,and related to meaning as well
as syntactic form. The report examines the conditions on the rules of
Raising to Object and Raising to Subject, and proposes that there are really
just a small number of factors involved. For example, the NP which is raised
must be perceived as a good discourse topic in the discourse context where
the sentence occurs. Differences of meaning among the variant forms can be
accounted for as inferences from different surface structures. Extra
inferred meanings are conveyed by the structures which are more complex to
process according to absolute measurements of syntactic complexity. It is
proposed, however, that syntactic complexity is not an absolute value, because
it may vary with discourse context and the function of the construction in
discourse. An understanding of the relation between syntactic complexity
and discourse function allows a writer to use more complex constructions
without increasing text difficulty for the reader.
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Linguistics and the Measurement of Syntactic Complexity:
The Case of Raising
In this paper, I want to show that a solution to a problem in linguistic
theory can have some general application to defining "complexity," features
of language which can contribute to difficulty in reading. Certain sentence
constructions, including ones which subordinate clauses in them, have a
reputation for being more complex, harder for the hearer or reader to process,
and therefore somewhat harder to read than other constructions. Writers
and editors who want to use simpler language in creating or adapting chil-
dren's texts often alter or delete these constructions. I want to examine
the criteria used for defining "complex" and inherently difficult construc-
tions, to show that they are justified to some extent, but that there is
another important dimension to complexity which has not been well defined
or often taken into account.
The particular case to be studied here involves the transformational
rules Subject to Subject Raising and Subject to Object Raising, which apply
in main clause-subordinate clause sentences, and relate supposedly synonymous
sentences as illustrated in the following two pairs of sentences.
(la) It seems that the raccoons are eating the garbage.
(b) The raccoons seem to be eating the garbage. (Subject to Subject
Raising)
(2a) John believes that he/*himself is responsible.
(b) John believes himself/*he to be responsible. (Subject to Object
Raising)
In (la), raccoons is the subject of the subordinate clause, which is marked
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by the complementizer that and functions as the subject of seem. In (Ib),
the plural verb agreement shows that raccoons is the subject of seem, and
the boundaries of the main and subordinate clauses are no longer apparent.
In (2a), the nominative case of he marks the pronoun as the subject of is
responsible, in the that clause which is the object of believe. In (2b),
the reflexive pronoun himself shows that the pronoun is no longer the subject
of the lower and instead is object of the main clause. Again the clause
boundaries have become unclear. (The standard arguments for this account
of the syntax of these sentences can be found in general works on trans-
formational grammar such as Akmajian & Heny, 1975; and Bach, 1974; and
the analysis is justified in greater detail in Postal, 1974.)
One of the questions which I want to address in this paper is whether
it is legitimate to speak of such sentences as being related syntactically,
when many people find them slightly different in meaning. The perceived
differences in meaning have been surveyed in Bach (1977) and Postal (1974),
and the points made in these and other works will be discussed more fully
in later sections of the paper. It is not disputed that (la) and (2a) are
very similar in meaning to (lb) and (2b). But given that a sentence in which
a raising rule has applied conveys a somewhat different meaning from the
corresponding sentence in which the rule has not applied, one may ask if it
is possible to assume that these sentences are syntactically related by being
derived from the same underlying structure from which semantic interpreta-
tion is derived.
What I want to justify here is the proposal that the pairs of sentences
like (1) and (2) are related by the optional application of rules of Raising,
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which do not alter meaning in a strict sense. Instead, the sentences convey
different readings because of different possible inferences based on the
surface structure of the sentences. This proposal preserves the assumptions
that transformations do not change meaning relevant to the truth conditions
of the sentence, and that meaning is derivable from an abstract level of
representation such as deep structure or a semantic structure.
These assumptions are rejected in work such as Bresnan (1976) and Chomsky
and Lasnik (1977), in which the relation between (2a) and (b) is no longer
expressed by a transformational rule, and the syntactic relation between
(la) and (b) is simply part of a more general movement rule. Alternatively,
one could postulate, as in Postal (1974), that (la) and (2a) are different
from (Ib) and (2b) because they are derived from different underlying struc-
tures. The rules of Raising must apply only if the underlying structure
contains some set of assumptions (perhaps represented as presuppositions),
and this element of meaning is absent where Raising does not apply. Raising
is therefore considered a rule whose application is subject to some semantic
factor associated with the sentence's deep structure.
As I wish to propose that the Raising rules are optional transformational
rules which do not change meaning, I will have to offer an explanation for
how there comes to be a difference between the meanings conveyed by different
surface structures. The explanation which I will propose involves the idea
that some structures are inherently more complex to process than other struc-
tures which are semantically equivalent to them in that they express the same
grammatical and logical relations. The notion of inherent complexity will
be further examined, and I will argue that complexity is not an absolute
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value, that it is dependent on discourse factors such as topic, and features
of the speech act the speaker is performing by uttering the sentence.
Definitions of Inherent Complexity
There are various approaches to predicting what kinds of structures
will be difficult for the hearer or reader to assign correct syntactic struc-
ture and semantic interpretation. These approaches range from very general
formulas based on sentence length and word frequency, to very specialized
descriptions of grammatical relations (agent, recipient, instrument, etc.) and
hierarchical relations among constituents, such as subordination. Among these
latter would fall the parsing models of Bever (1970), Frazier and Fodor (1978),
Frazier (1979), and Kimball (1975). These models are general procedures
for grouping syntactic constituents such as nouns, verbs, etc. into larger
constituents by matching linear strings of words to standard patterns.
The more difficult constructions are the ones which require more attempts
to analyze and identify the correct syntactic structure.
The sentences which illustrated the application of Raising transforma-
tions could be measured for probable complexity according to the four criteria
listed below.
Criterion A--Clause complexity. The longer the sentence, the more likely
it is that it contains internal clauses, or clause-like subconstituents.
Bormuth (1966) has shown a high correlation between length and clause com-
plexity. It is assumed, at least by proponents of readability formulas,
that long sentences with subordinate clauses are harder to process than short
and un-complex sentences.
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Criterion B--Transparency of grammatical relations. The surface structure
of a sentence may give accurate indications of the underlying grammatical
relations, so that the agent, object, recipient, etc. are easily identified.
If word order, verb agreement, and so on do not directly indicate the underlying
grammatical relations, the structure is hard to process.
Criterion C--Subject and topic correlation. The noun phrase in subject
position is generally perceived as the sentence topic, unless such an inference
is unreasonable in the discourse context. If the NP in subject position
does not refer to something that has been picked out in the previous discourse,
the sentence is hard to process, as is the sentence in which the discourse
topic has been placed in some other position in the sentence than in subject
position.
Criterion D--Hierarchical regularity. If the contents of the grammatically
subordinate constituents are not also logically subordinate, the structure is
harder to process than a structure where grammatical subordination matches
logical and discourse subordination.
By the above Criteria A, B, and D, the structures in which Raising has
applied, (lb) and (2b), would be complex. By Criteria A, C, and D, the
corresponding sentences in which Raising has not applied would also be pre-
dicted to be hard to process. The specific features of the sentences will
be discussed below.
Criterion A is a commonly applied criterion, one which follows from
readability formulas based on the number of words or syllables in a sentence.
It has been shown in a study of the predictions made by readability formulas
and other measures (Bormuth, 1966) that the length of a sentence is
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correlated with the degree to which constituents are embedded in it. It is
fairly obvious that a sentence could not have several embedded clauses in it
and not be fairly long. Certainly such a sentence would generally be longer
than the average sentence with no internal clause constituents. If a sen-
tence does contain internal constituents, the hearer or reader has to identify
the beginning and end of the embedded structure, as well as its category.
This is part of the task which is modeled by the parsing strategies described
in (b) below. In any case, the structures in (1) and (2) would be character-
ized as more complex because they both contain subconstituents.
Criterion B is related to parsing strategies which assign the grammatical
relations to strings of constituents (for general discussion of parsing
strategies see Frazier, 1979). One of the strategies discussed in Bever
(1970) assigns the grammatical roles Actor-Action-Object to strings of words
where the words belong to the categories Noun-Verb-Noun, in that order.
This is a very general strategy which can be applied with correct results
in many cases. But it gives incorrect results if the verb is one of a
subclass of verbs, like receive or resemble, whose subject is not an Actor
or volitional agent. It gives incorrect results also in sentences where
Raising rules have applied, because the grammatical roles of the underlying
structure do not match the grammatical roles- indicated in the surface structure.
For example, in (lb), raccoons is no longer the surface subject of
are eating after Raising to Subject has applied. Instead, it is the subject
of seem. Yet raccoons should be identified as the Actor associated with
eat, and not with the non-volitional abstract subject which goes with seems.
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The grammatical relations in a sentence in which Raising to Object might
apply are indicated schematically in (4):
(3a) We believed that Benedict Arnold gave information to the enemy.
(b) We believed Benedict Arnold to have given information to the enemy.
(4a) We believed that Benedict Arnold gave information to the enemy.
N V N V N prep N
Actor Action Actor Action Object Recipient
Object
(b) We believed Benedict Arnold to have given information to the enemy.
N V N FV N Prep N
Actor Action rObject Action Object RecipientJ
LActor J
In (4a), the grammatical rules straightforwardly follow the surface order,
and can be assigned in accordance with them. On the other hand, in (4b),
it is hard to assign the correct grammatical relations to Benedict Arnold.
Its position following the verb believe should make it an Object since there
is no that complementizer to signal the beginning of an embedded sentence.
But its position preceding to have given should assign it the role of subject.
The point I want to make here is that the grammatical relations of (4b)
are not transparent; that is, they cannot be straightforwardly assigned on
the first try just on the basis of category information (i.e., whether the
word belongs to the category N, V, etc.), semantic information about the V,
linear order, and markers of syntactic boundaries.
In contrast, the assignment of relations in (4a) is much more straight-
forward. It might therefore be predicted that structures like (4b) would
be more difficult to process than (ha). It is reasonable to suppose that
the usual case in languages like English is for the Actor to precede the
Action and for the Object to follow, and that is generally true unless there
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are signals, like inverted word order, that the normal pattern does not apply.
An example would be Nectarines we don't have, parsed as N N . . .V.
Criterion C: Generally speaking, the subject position of a sentence in
English is occupied by a Noun Phrase which could be reasonably interpreted
as the topic of the sentence (the individual or whatever the predicate
is predicated of) and the topic of the immediately preceding discourse.
The notion topic has been of interest to linguists for some time, because
it seems to interact with sentence structure in many languages (see Li, 1976,
for papers on a range of languages). Unfortunately for linguists, it is not
a term which can be easily defined in formal terms (see Li, 1976, for attempts
to define topic from several points of view). It seems to be in essence a
discourse-related notion, not a grammatical category, perhaps derived by
inference from discourse context and syntactic surface structure. It may
be marked by the same devices which mark grammatical categories, though not
in all sentences, and not in all languages. The implications for processing
passive sentences have been explored in Perfetti and Goldman (1975), Gourlay
(1978), Gourlay and Catlin (1978), and Levelt (1978).
Languages (apparently) have optional rules, or choices of constructions,
for which there is no functional explanation other than the fact that such
constructions tend to make a topic Noun Phrase more easily spotted by the
hearer or reader. Suppose that the previous discourse has been about a cer-
tain object X, and the speaker wants to communicate something more about
that thing, in a sentence in which its grammatical role is that of direct
object. If the speaker puts the direct object in subject position, in a
passive sentence, it is clearer that the item X continues to be the topic of
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discourse, the thing which the passive sentence is "about," than if the NP
referring to X were in object position after the verb, where it would normally
be consigned as a direct object. Marking the topic in some overt way is
not obligatory in English sentences, in contrast to Japanese. Yet there are
many devices for marking topics in English, and making use of them is a way
of maintaining continuity in discourse.
Though topic marking is not obligatory for each individual sentence,
a discourse in which the individual sentence topics are not marked, or are
not consistent, will give the impression of being disconnected, not "about"
anything easily identifiable, or of having many shifts of topic. The context
of utterance and common knowledge shared by the speaker and hearer may go a
long way to repairing any such possible defects in the discourse form. But
in written language it is more likely that it is useful or necessary for cor-
rect interpretation. So the notion of topic ought to be an issue in measuring
readability. It is no doubt an issue in teaching composition to older stu-
dents. But aside from some psycholinguistic experiments with younger children
on passive sentences (for example Gourlay & Catlin, 1978, reported in
Gourlay, 1978), there does not seem to be much importance given to topic
in children's reading material, other than what would follow from the common
sense of writers and editors.
By the topic marking criterion, a sentence in which Raising to Object
has applied ought to be more difficult to process than a similar sentence
in which it has not applied. The subject and potential topic of the lower
clause has also become the object and non-topic of the higher clause. Of
course, it might be moved to subject position by Passive, in which case it
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would be the topic of the higher sentence. The same result is achieved by
Raising to Subject, which moves the subject/topic of the lower clause into
subject/topic position of the higher clause. (This fact may explain why there
appear to be different restrictions on raising NPs to different positions in
a sentence, in English and other languages.) The notion of topic and require-
ments placed on the raised NP will be closely related in the following
discussion.
Criterion D: It has been noted (Hooper & Thompson, 1973) that there are
declarative sentences in which the material of the subordinate clause consti-
tutes the statement made in the sentence. The higher clause, as in (5), is not
part of what is asserted, and in fact its presence often does not prevent
rules from applying which normally do not apply in subordinate clauses (Hooper
& Thompson).
(5a) I think that they'll come at 4:00.
(b) They'll come at 4:00.
(6a) Most scientists believe that Mendel's theory was correct.
(b) Mendel's theory was correct.
The (a) sentences can be used simply to make assertions equivalent to the (b)
sentences, which do not have a higher clause. This is not necessarily the case,
of course, as (5a)-(6a) may be used to assert thinking or belief, in which
case the (a) sentences present no difficulty of interpretation.
But in the other and more ordinary usage, what is syntactically higher
is interpreted as subordinate, and the contents of the subordinate clause
are more prominent, as though the higher clause were absent, or served in-
stead as an abverbial modifier. The surface syntactic relations do not give
an adequate indication of the relative prominence of the component
Syntactic Complexity
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clauses. Somehow the hearer or reader has to construct some other interpre-
tation. Clearly one of the factors which is crucial to this is the verb
in the higher sentence, which is generally one indicating belief, perception,
or some other kind of epistemic qualification. The general class of such
verbs will turn up again in connection with the cases of Raising where "mean-
ing differences" are encountered. In any case, even without Raising, the
occurrence of epistemic non-factive verbs in higher sentences requires some
additional processing, and hence such sentences would tend to be more difficult
to comprehend, if only marginally so.
(7a) I suppose Fred will bark at the mailman, won't he?
(b) Fred will bark at the mailman, won't he?
In the sections which have just preceded, I have described four different
criteria which would be used in predicting the relatively greater difficulty
of structures in certain English sentences, compared with sentences which
did not contain subordinate clauses, epistemic verbs, or inconsistently marked
grammatical relations and topic NPs. The structures in which the Raising
rules could apply have just these characteristics, and so ought to be rela-
tively more difficult to process inherently. This is particularly true of
sentences in which Raising rules have applied, since the rules obscure the
embedded sentence boundary, change grammatical relations,and affect what is
in topic position, as well as forcing the "subordinate" interpretation of
epistemic verbs like believe.
Note that these criteria, except for the first, A,, all make stronger
predictions than the usual readability formulas, which measure very general
features such as length of sentences expressed in number of syllables or
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words; these are described in some detail in works like Klare (1963).
Readability formulas would not make any distinction of predicted difficulty
between the structures in which Raising has applied and comparable struc-
tures where it has not applied, since the length of the sentences is more
or less the same. Yet I believe that structures in which Raising rules have
applied are considered inherently difficult by writers and adaptors who
create texts for children to read. For example, a study which compared
original and adapted versions of texts used as material for reading practice
(Davison, Kantor, Hannah, Hermon, Lutz, & Salzillo, 1980) noted the syn-
tactic and other changes which were made in order to lower the level of
reading difficulty of the texts. Among these were the substitution of
structures in which Raising had applied for some paraphrase. For example:
(8a) (original version) It is said to be the biggest, and perhaps
the oldest living thing in the world.
(b) (adapted version) It may be the biggest and oldest living thing
in the world.
(9a) The Romans were said by Pliny to rub bread soaked in asses' milk
on their faces to make them fairer and to prevent the growth
of beards.
(b) The Romans rubbed bread soaked in milk on their faces. They
thought that this would make their skin paler. They also thought
this would keep their beards from growing!
(lOa) Hippocrates recommended milk as a curative beverage.
(b) One of the most famous Greek doctors told his patients to drink
milk to cure illness.
The paraphrases which have been substituted in the (b) versions would indeed
be easier to process, and probably easier to read, than the original
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(a) structures, at least by the four criteria which I outlined. (Of course,
it might be argued that the paraphrases do not convey exactly the same
meaning as the original.)
In the main body of this study, I want also to attack the idea that
structures in which Raising rules have applied are in fact inherently more
difficult to process than equivalent structures where Raising has not applied,
or even more difficult than sentences with fewer clauses. Defining inherent
difficulty by Criteria A, B, and D does not take into account the discourse
context in which the sentence in question is used. I want to propose that
raised structures may be inherently harder to process, because of Criteria
B and D in particular. But what determines if they are actually more diffi-
cult to process in a given discourse context is something like Criterion C,
which defines sentence topic in conflict or in congruence with expectations
which have been aroused by preceding discourse. This in turn will lead me
to talk about which raised structures can be used to communicate, which are
not communicated, or conveyed as well, by the unraised structures.
There is a common link between questions about characterizing the dif-
ficulty of a particular construction, with implications for its contributing
to difficulty of reading a text, and the question of how to account for the
apparent anomalies attached to the transformational rules of Raising. These
anomalies will be discussed in detail in the following sections. The anomalies
are connected with exactly the factors mentioned in the criteria for predict-
ing relative difficulty of constructions. For this reason, I believe that
an adequate answer to one set of questions also answers the others. Two
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apparently unrelated issues, in the study of difficulty in language learning
or in reading, and in the statement of syntactic rules, actually share common
ground.
Strange Properties of Raising Rules
The discussion about the transformational rule(s) of Raising centers
on the syntactic relationship between (11a)-(12a) and (11b)-(12b).
(1a) We believe that he is honest.
(b) We believe him to be honest.
(12a) It seems that Carola is inebriated.
(b) Carola seems to be inebriated.
Under the standard transformational analysis (such as that outlined in
Akmajian & Heny, 1975; and Bach, 1974), the subject NP of the subordinate
clause is raised into the higher clause, and assumes the same grammatical
role, subject or object, that the source clause occupied. The subjectless
subordinate clause ends up in final position in the VP of the higher sen-
2
tence, roughly speaking. The syntactic details will be discussed on p. 34.
The (b) sentences in (11) and (12) are therefore derived from the same
underlying structure as the (a) sentences, with the difference that the
complementizer that appears in the (a), unraised structures, and to appears
in the raised (b) structures. The option of applying Raising is therefore
related to the choice of complementizer. (There is a third complementizer,
as, which does allow Raising; since the to cases do not differ significantly
from these cases, I will mainly discuss just the to examples.)
I have just discussed reasons why the ouput of the Raising transfor-
mation ought to be considered more difficult structures to process than
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unraised structures. But so far as I know the transformational operations
involved in Raising have not been considered from the point of view of
discourse function, that is, from the point of view of the speaker's moti-
vations in speaking, or the choices available about how best to communicate
it. Ordinarily, speculations on such issues would have no legitimate place
in the formulation of a transformation, or any other purely syntactic mapping
or statement of equivalence between one structure and another.
It turns out, however, that a transformational account of the relation-
ship between raised and unraised corresponding structures runs into some
extrasyntactic problems, described in Postal (1974, chapter 11), and further
explored in Borkin (Note 1) and Bach (1977). Each of these will be discussed
shortly but either the raised sentence appears to mean something "different"
from the unraised one, or the ranges of meaning associated with the unraised
version are greater than in the sentence in which raising has applied. This
would mean that the rule is obligatory, if some set of special assumptions
is associated with the sentence, or that its application might be blocked,
if the NP subject which is a candidate for Raising has the wrong properties,
and if the predicate is of the wrong sort. The assemblage of conditions,
however complex, might be incorporated into the grammar with some reluctance,
but there is a further problem that the restriction and meaning differences
are not consistent from one speaker to another. Speakers disagree in judg-
ments about well-formedness of sentences, and about the meaning differences
between the raised and unraised cases. In fact, speakers of English whose
judgments I have recorded agreed that the raised and unraised counterpart
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sentences differ in some very specific way, but some of them assign the dif-
ferent meanings to exactly opposite structures.
In what follows I will give some examples of the kinds of differences
which have been reported by various writers. I do not want to claim that
all speakers of English will agree with the descriptions of meaning summarized
here, but I think it is important to look at the range of differences which
have been reported for at least some speakers. I will propose a solution
which takes into account the variability or fugitive quality of judgments.
A. The raised sentence conveys that the speaker (or subject of the
higher verb) has personal and direct knowledge about the referent of the NP
which has been raised. Compare the (a) and (b) sentences below:
(13a) We believe that Winston is obstinate.
(b) We believe Winston to be obstinate.
(14a) It struck me that Julius Caesar was honest. (Postal, 1974, p. 357)
(b) Julius Caesar struck me as honest.
(15a) It just now struck me that my wife has been dead two years
tomorrow.
(b) *My wife has just now struck me as having been dead two years
tomorrow. (W. Cantrall, cited in Postal, 1974, p. 357)
(16a) It seems that Bill is drunk. (J. Morgan, personal communication)
(b) Bill seems to be drunk.
The (a) sentences are more or less neutral, implying nothing about the basis
for the speaker's knowledge of the state of affairs described in the sub-
ordinate clause. But the (b) sentences generally convey that the speaker
has first-hand knowledge of the referent of the NP which has undergone
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Raising, and that the "judgment expressed is a function of this experience"
(Postal, 1974).
Postal regards the differences between (13a)-(16a) and (13b)-(16b)
as "a function of differences in meaning" (1974, p. 357) which persists under
question and negation (1974, p. 358). The application of Raising is therefore
linked to the presence of a set of special assumptions, expressed as part
of the semantic structure of the sentence. Even if the (a) and (b) sentences
are felicitously uttered under different conditions of speaker belief about
the same proposition, it is not necessary to conclude that meaning differences
are involved, especially ones which are relevant to the truth conditions
of the sentence as a whole. It is a mistake, in my view, to equate the
propositional contents of an assertion or question, etc. with the grounds
for asserting a statement or the answer to a question. The grounds for
performing a speech act are expressed in the same terms as the contents of
a speech act, yet treating them all in the same way leads to paradoxes
(Boeir & Lycan, Note 2). The difference between the (a) and (b) sentences
above seems to me to be less a difference of the truth conditional meaning
of the contents of the proposition asserted or question, and more a differ-
ence in strength of an assertion, or solicited information. It is a common
observation that assertions may be made on strong or weak grounds, on the
basis of supposition and guesses, or on the basis of first-hand personal
knowledge.
B. Some instances of raised and unraised counterparts differ in that the
raised case is ill-formed, strange, or, as in the previous set of cases, lacks
the range of meaning possible with the unraised case. In the latter case,
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then, one possible interpretation is ill-formed in the raised case. Some of
these are derivative from the preceding cases, where first-hand knowledge
is or is not involved. (17b) is odd for this reason, while (18b) is odd
because one can only have first-hand knowledge of oneself, hence no contrast
should be possible:
(17a) It has just now struck me that my wife has been dead for two years.
(b) ??My wife has just now struck me as having been dead for two years.
(W. Cantrall, cited in Postal, 1974, p. 357)
(18a) I believe that I am flying over Patagonia.
(b) ?I believe myself to be flying over Patagonia. (Ibid)
Tomoda (1976-77) notes that in Japanese, the Raising to Object rule produces
sentences analogous to (18b), which are taken to reflect the .speaker's
point of view. Sentences which could be taken to reflect the speaker's point
of view, and where Raising has not applied, like the counterparts in Japanese
of (18a) are anomalous.
Raising in English may produce strange results like (17b) or (18b),
and the strangeness may be expressed in terms of what the speaker could not
have as first-hand knowledge (17b), or what the speaker must have as first-
hand knowledge (18b). Not applying Raising in Japanese to the counterparts
of (18) produces an anomalous sentence equivalent to the well-formed English
sentence (18a). The strangeness of the ill-formed sentence in Japanese
would also be expressed as a result of the sentence form being incompatible
with the assumption that the speaker must have first-hand knowledge of him
or herself. So first-hand knowledge is a factor governing the application
of the rules of Raising in both English and Japanese, but it has different
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effects--specifying the rule output as ill-formed in English and as well-
formed in Japanese. If one is interested in how the "same" rule is realized
in different languages, the inconsistency between English and Japanese just
described here is very puzzling. It is particularly troublesome if something
referring to first-hand knowledge must be made part of the semantic structure
or of the syntactic formulation of the transformational rule. Later I will
propose an alternative way of explaining this condition.
In other sentences where Raising is at issue in English, the well-
formedness of the output of the rule, or the range of the possible interpreta-
tions which the output may have, are linked to the kind of NP which is moved
by the rules. It is well known that referring expressions like definite NPs
can be used in radically different ways with no apparent difference of form.
One such distinction is the difference between the referential and attributive
uses of definite noun phrases (Donellan, 1971). Under the attributive reading,
the speaker and hearer identify the referent solely on the basis of the de-
scription provided. The NP refers then to whatever individual matches the
description. Under the referential reading, the speaker uses the NP descrip-
tion as a convenient means of identifying a referent which the speaker already
has in mind. In this case, the description need not exactly match the prop-
erties of the individual referred to. It is not clear that this is a semantic
disctinction, as the context of utterance will have an influence on the read-
ings which are preferred or possible in a given instance.
Application of Raising usually rules out the attributive reading for
the raised NP. This is noted in Borkin (Note 1) and illustrated in (19).
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Bach (1977, p. 642) discusses a similar difference between the specific and
nonspecific interpretations of indefinite NPs.
(19a) It seems to us that Smith's murderer is insane. (referential/
attributive)
(b) Smith's murderer seems to us to be insane. (referential/
*attributive)
(20a) We supposed that a rodent had been attacking the carrots.
(specific/nonspecific indefinite)
(b) We supposed a rodent to have been attacking the carrots.
(specific/*nonspecific)
(21a) It may have happened that a man in a black hat came into the bar.
(specific/nonspecific indefinite)
(b) A man in a black hat may have happened to come into the bar.
(specific/*nonspecific indefinite)
(19a)-(21a)could be used with either of the possible interpretations,
all other things being equal. But it would be strange, except in unusual
circumstances, to use (19b) without some clear idea who Smith's murderer
is, or to use (20b)-(21b)without having strong grounds for believing that
a rodent in the garden really exists or that there is a man in a black hat
who the speaker could identify. The judgments are fairly subtle, and a dif-
ference is not necessarily perceptible in every possible sentence. Yet the
reported judgments are not at all surprising.
The raised structure implicates personal acquaintance of the speaker with
the referent of the NP, in cases where a proper name is used to refer to an
individual who is assumed to be existent and unique. In other cases, where
description rather than names are used to refer, the raised structure allows
the kind of reference which is most compatible with direct acquaintance.
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The referential reading of a definite description is the closest match to
direct knowledge, as the speaker has a particular individual in mind. The
specific indefinite reading is also compatible in this way, as under this
reading the existence of the referent is assumed, or asserted first, what-
ever other predicate is involved. Personal acquaintance, the referential
reading, and the specific indefinite reading are all part of the same phenom-
enon, though it is not immediately clear which is the crucial factor from
which the others follow.
Borkin (Note 1) describes in great detail some other factors which
favor or inhibit Raising to Object position. She summarizes judgments on
sentences in the term of hierarchies, the items belonging to one end of which
undergo Raising with well-formed results. Those on the other end generally
make the output strange or ill-formed if they undergo Raising.
(22) Hierarchy of Noun Phrases
a. Referential NPs, reified NPs known through personal knowledge,
referentially transparent descriptions (attributed to the
speaker), existential there.
b. Attributive NPs, definite NPs; a, some N; abstract NPs;
referentially opaque NPs.
c. Generic any
d. Non-referring NPs, superlatives, it (weather), empty NPs like
tabs, the jig (discussed in more detail in Steever, 1977).
This hierarchy subsumes some of the properties of NPs discussed in the
preceding sections.
Borkin has also investigated more closely than any other writer on
Raising the properties of the complement clause out of which a NP is raised
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to object position. Certain kinds of predicates are more compatible than
others with the to complementizer whose presence makes Raising obligatory.
These are generic and stative predicates, which match the tenseless character
of infinitive clauses, which not only generally lack morphologically expressed
tense, but which also lack reference to specific events, all other things
being equal (cf. Riddle, 1975). Under the same circumstances, a tensed that
clause at least implicates reference to a specific event, particularly
if the tense is not the simple present. This is not necessarily the case;
the English language has various means of indicating specific or generic
time reference in both finite and infinitive clauses. But Borkin's contrast
of the corresponding that and to has convinced me that there is a clear dif-
ference of acceptability, determined more or less by the following factors
(summarized from Borkin, Note 1 ):
(23) For to (as)
a. Non-specific time reference
b. Proposition expresses subjective judgment; the proposition
is not objectively verifiable.
c. The proposition expresses a non-temporary, non-accidental
attribute, which is likely to be stative.
d. The higher predicate is non-factive, so the proposition may
not be presupposed to be true.
(24) That complementizer
a. Reference to a specific event (further discussed in Riddle,
1975).
b. The proposition constitutes an objective judgment, empirically
verifiable.
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c. The proposition may express a temporary, accidental state of
affairs, which may therefore be non-stative. It also may
contain what Kuno calls a "neutral" description.
d. The higher predicate may be factive, so the proposition may be
presupposed to be true.
Again, the properties in (23) which favor Raising and those in (24) which
would inhibit Raising if they were to occur in to clauses are fuzzy tendencies,
whose influence may not be apparent in every conceivable example, and about
which individual speakers may differ. But I think they hold as Borkin has
described them for at least some sentences. They are interesting because
they do exist in some sense as conditions on Raising, and because they do
not hold absolutely and consistently all the time.
Having constructed this synopsis of all the peculiar conditions on
Raising that various writers have noted, I want to ask whether any sense can
be made out of them. As they stand, they represent a complicated and semi-
coherent set of conditions on Raising, which might indeed be sufficient to
force one to the conclusion that there is something very complex about sen-
tences in which the rule is deemed to have applied. But I think there is
another view, which rests on two notions which are not, strictly speaking,
part of a theory of syntax. This is described below.
These notions are conversational implicature, following Grice (1975),
and topic, as discussed earlier in the paper. There is perhaps a third
important notion, the distinction between the contents of an assertion or
other speech act, and qualifiers which comment on the speaker's attitude
towards the contents or the speech act itself. This almost metalinguistic
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content gets expressed in the same way as the propositional contents of the
assertion or other speech act.
First, I want to propose that the restrictions on NPs which undergo
Raising, or rather the factors which favor Raising, define just the charac-
teristics of what is perceived in a topic NP. Kuno (1973), discussing the
marking of NPs in Japanese with the topic marker wa, notes that the NPs which
can felicitiously be marked with wa are either generic or anaphoric. That is,
their reference is either completely general, and the existence and identity
of their referents can be taken for granted, or else they refer to individ-
uals previously mentioned, whose identity is completely clear to the speaker
and hearer. Assuming that something of this definition of topic NP can be
carried over to subject-topic languages like English which do not have a
topic particle like wa, we see that NPs whose referent is directly known to
the speaker, or to which the speaker refers on grounds stronger than just
deduction or supposition about their existence, are NPs which are excellent
candidates for being the topic of the utterance in which they occur. Abstract
NPs have no referent that the speaker could be personally acquainted with,
except in a figurative sense. Generic any may fail to define a clear topic
because it does not guarantee that there is a referent for the NP; that is,
it does not always have existential import.
There in existential sentences is an exception to the generalization
of the preceding paragraph. Clearly, there undergoes Raising with absolute
impunity:
(25a) There seems to be fly in my soup.
(b) We believe there to be a serious crime wave in Metropolis.
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(c) ??We believe a serious crime wave to be in Metropolis.
(d) We believe there to be unanimity among the discussants.
(e) ??We believe unanimity to be among the discussants.
There-Insertion is analyzed as taking place in sentences whose subject is
indefinite, and therefore not the very best kind of topic, particularly as
the collocation there is conveys a statement about existence (cf. Milsark,
1977). The referent of the indefinite NP is therefore not assumed to be
known to the hearer, as it has not been previously mentioned. It would there-
fore not constitute a good topic on a number of counts. If it remained in
subject position, it could undergo Raising, with the kind of ill-formed
results, reported in Borkin (Note 1), but it is displaced by There-Insertion
to a position somewhere to the right of subject position. The semantically
empty there serves as a place-holder, keeping out of topic position a NP
which would make an inferior and unsatisfactory topic. (Milsark, 1977, remarks
that it is a commonplace observation that the indefinite subject in sentences
in which There-insertion applies is never the topic of the sentence.) An
"unsatisfactory topic" does not of course render the sentence ungrammatical;
see below.
I propose, therefore, that the non-syntactic conditions on what kind of
NP may undergo Raising can be reduced to just one necessary condition:
that the NP in question constitutes a "good" topic. This is a very relative
and context-influenced notion, which is appropriate as a description of very
relative and context-influenced judgments of well-formedness. Topic itself
cannot be defined with the kinds of objectively definable tests for category
membership that apply to syntactic constituents (cf. Zwicky, 1977). Violations
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of the "good topic" condition should not produce syntactically ill-formed
structures, and I think that this prediction is in accordance with the facts.
Compare a sentence with a raised NP of the wrong degree of topicness with
a case where a non-subject has been raised, or where the complementizer
is that:
(26a) ?We believe the slightest discrepancy to be irritating to him
(Borkin, Note 1, p. 73).
(b) *We believe him for loud music to be irritating to.
(c) *We believe corn pollen that causes allergies.
There is a clear difference between (26a) and (26b),(c). No amount of familiar-
ity with the context or imagination is going to make the latter two sentences
sound like English. (2 6 a) has more of a pointless quality than actual
ungrammatical ity.
To conclude this section, and to account for Borkin's condition on the
contents of the complement clause, I will invoke a similar solution. The
raised NP must be a good topic, and the rest of the complement clause must
be a good comment, and express something about the referent of the topic NP.
For the utterance to have a point, the material predicated about the topic NP
ought to be a fairly significant quality. The generic or stative or non-
temporary quality that Borkin notes is probably due in large part to the
tenseless character of infinitives, which as Riddle (1975) points out, are
generally associated with non-specific time reference. That clauses, on
the other hand, have overtly marked tense, and if corresponding infinitive
and that clauses are compared, it is the finite clause which will be inter-
preted as having reference to a specific event. Finally, the subjective
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quality of the content of the complement clause follows from the nature of
the verb in the higher clause.
If we look at the verbs which allow Raising and where "meaning" and
acceptability seem to be affected by the factors discussed above, we find
that they have the common property of being epistemic, of expressing informa-
tion about the truth of the proposition in their complements. None of them
4
are true factives, whose complements are presupposed to be true; if the
complement is already assumed to be true, it would be pointless if not
contradictory to add hedges or qualifications about the grounds for believing
that the proposition in the complement is true. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971)
note that Raising does not apply if the verb in the higher sentence is
factive. It would be contradictory to presuppose a proposition and then
describe the grounds for belief as imperfect.
The array of verbs given below overlaps considerably with the so-called
"assertive" verbs of Hooper and Thompson (1973), which are in some metaphorical
sense transparent. When they govern Raising, they are superordinate syn-
tactically, but semantically peripheral or pragmatically subordinate.
(27) Raising to Subject:
seem
appear
unl ikely/likely
strike
happen
Even happen is an epistemic verb rather than an aspectual verb. What it
conveys in (28) has little to do with the occurrence of events.
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(28a) It happens that Chris has asthma.
(b) Fred happens to be a good friend of mine.
Rather, the use of happen, especially with propositions describing non-events,
conveys that the proposition is true, but accidentally so. Expressing some
necessary logical or mathematical truth with happen can only be interpreted
as sarcasm:
(29a) 2 + 2 happens to equal 4.
(b) n + 1 happens to define n's successor.
(c) Dogs happen to be mammals.
(30) Raising to Object:
(a) believe (b) say
think declare
know state
suppose assert
guess announce
consider report
assume reveal
regard (as) disclose
perceive confirm
presume prove
establ ish show
understand demonstrate
recognize
The verbs in (30) fall into two natural groups, which may actually overlap
(e.g., in report). Group (a) includes verbs of belief and perception.
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Judgments of "meaning" differences have been usually reported about raised
sentences with one of these verbs. Group (b) contains verbs which describe
a speech act, such as assert, or some aspect of a verbal act, for example,
disclose. When the complements of these verbs are actually the main point
of the utterance, the higher clause and in particular its verb serve a kind
of weak modifying function. Either the basis of the asserted proposition
is expressed--belief or supposition etc.--or the manner in which the proposi-
tion was conveyed is described. In either case, the contents of the higher
clauses are redundant in that they are inferrable--that there are grounds
of some sort for the speaker's belief in the asserted proposition.
If someone asserts the proposition in (28), it can be assumed from the
fact that the assertion was uttered sincerely that the speaker thinks p,
believes p, and the speaker has grounds for believing p. (Sincerity and
other conditions on speech acts are discussed in Searle, 1969.) Saying (31)
is often not really different from saying the corresponding sentences in
(32):
(31a) The train stops at Rantoul. (, because the conductor said so.)
(b) It's raining outside.
(c) The dog is friendly.
(32a) The conductor says that the train stops at Rantoul.
(b) I think it's raining outside.
(c) I believe the dog is friendly.
The (32) sentences are just hedged about with respect to the Speaker's
certainty. These sentences, without Raising, may be understood as counting
almost as simple assertions of the complement proposition. In structures
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in which Raising has applied, I find it more likely that the sentence will
be understood as an assertion primarily of the complement, and only periph-
erally of the epistemic higher material.
There are several important consequences of this observation. If the
higher material is understood not as the primary assertion, but as some
epistemic adjunct, then it is not clear that the higher clause should count
in the assessment of the truth of what is asserted (questioned), etc., at
least on the non-literal reading of (32). That is, its truth or falsity is
independent of the truth or falsity of the complement. The higher material
would have to be judged for truth or falsity by the same means, whatever they
may be, that assign the values true or false to speech acts, or which medi-
ates between speech acts (felicitous or infelicitous) and propositions within
speech acts (true or false). The kinds of extra "meanings" conveyed by
raised structures are epistemic, more relevant to the grounds for belief in
a proposition than in the contents of the proposition itself. "First-hand
knowledge" is a notion which is not uncommonly expressed in human language,
usually by some morphological category, such as aspect or mood. It is
somewhat unusual, perhaps, for this sort of meaning to be associated with
the application of a transformational rule, but I think that an explanation
of this fact can be found.
Meaning can be associated with utterances on some occasions without
being part of the meaning of the sentence uttered. That is, it need not
be meaning expressed by the lexical items in the sentence or their grammatical
relations (cf. Grice, 1975). I propose that the kind of "meaning" which
is associated with Raising is an instance of meaning conveyed by
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"conversational implicature," meaning which does not affect the truth condi-
tions of the sentence it is associated with (cf. Schmerling, 1978). Of the
tests for the presence of implicated meaning, given in Grice (1975) and further
discussed in Sadock (1978), three are consistent with this hypothesis, and
results of the fourth are indeterminate. The evidence for implicature in
this case is discussed in the following pages.
If the special meaning associated with raised structures is epistemic,
and qualifies the speech act as a whole and not just the asserted proposition,
then it is unlikely that presence of the special meaning can affect the truth
value of the propositional contents of the sentence; conversational implicature
does not change meaning. Second, the special meaning can be asserted sep-
arately without redundancy, as in (33a).
(33a) Caesar struck me as fussy; I had known him for years and seen
him in many situations.
(b) It struck me that Caesar was fussy; I had known him for years
without realizing this.
The "first-hand knowledge" meaning is also compatible with the unraised
version, (33b). Implicated meaning, unlike presupposed or lexical meaning,
can be separately asserted. Third, the special meaning can be "calculated,"
derived by some chain of reasoning from the sentence's contents and general
maxims for cooperative conversation (Grice, 1975). In this case, the relevant
maxim is the Maxim of Manner; if the speaker has a choice of form to express
what is to be said, then the particular choice may convey something in excess
of its actual meaning. More on this subject will be discussed below.
The extra "meaning" is hard to cancel without contradiction. Normally
implicated meaning can be cancelled. Because of the entailment relation
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between the "extra" meaning and the literal meaning, it is hard to cancel
just the "extra" meaning without also contradicting the rest.
(34a) Caesar struck me as honest, I read all of the historical
descriptions of him that I could find.
(b) ?Caesar struck me as honest, though I don't have any special
first-hand knowledge of him.
(34a), which many speakers find well-formed, may either be an instance of
successful cancellation of the "first-hand knowledge" meaning or a case of
reinforcement, where acquaintance with historical facts counts as first-hand
knowledge.
My proposal, therefore, is that the special properties of sentences
related by rules of Raising are actually conversationally inferred from
sentence surface structures, rather than being part of the conditions on the
rules or of the deep structures which the rules apply to. This proposal
is not the first to make use of a solution of this type. Schmerling (1978)
describes some sentences which can be accounted for either by Raising to
Object or by Equi-NP-Deletion, but not both. She proposes that the differ-
ences of meaning which appear to support the Equi-NP-Deletion analysis are
actually the result of conversational inferences based on real-world knowledge,
rather than underlying differences of grammatical relations.
Steever (1977) also makes use of conversational inference in describing
the differences between structures in which Raising has applied and those
where it has not applied. He argues that the structure resulting from the
application of Raising is in some sense the more "usual," which fits more
closely than the unraised structure the normal syntactic patterns of English
surface structures. For him, it is the unraised structure which is "marked"
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structure, or the unusual case, the one which has some extra, distinctive
characteristics which separate it from the normal case. He bases this
description on an analogy with other structures of English, which are illus-
trated below.
The analogy that Steever draws hold between structures consisting of
two underlying clauses. In one case, Raising to Object applies, as in (35a)
and (b):
(35) Raising to Object
a. S b. S
NP VP NP VP
V NP V
believe believe to VP
Sto VP
In the other case, a transformation called Verb Raising applies, as in (36a)
and (b):
(36) Causatives - Verb Raising with Clause Union
a. S b S
NP VP
V
I
CAUSE
BECOME OPEN
NP VP
V NP
CAUSE BECOME OPEN
= open
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The operation of this rule is discussed in Aissen (1974). I think it is
correct to say, as McCawley (1978) proposes, that the "marked" or unusual
form for causative sentences is the structure in which Verb Raising has
not applied, or (36a). But I think that the analogy is misleading, and that
what is true of causative sentences is not true of other biclausal structures
in which the Raising rules may apply.
My impression is that it is the raised structure, such as (35b), that
has special or restricted meanings associated with it, even though speakers
are sometimes inconsistent and variable; Borkin (Note 1) seems to share this
judgment. As a second point which would support my observation over Steever's,
Raising rules are governed. That is, they can apply only if the verb in the
higher clause belongs to a certain class of verbs, which includes believe,
but not, for example, write. So, for the most part, the structures of the
type illustrated in (35b) have counterparts with that and an unraised NP
in (35a), but not every sentence with the form (35a) has a Raised counterpart
like (35b). Begin and a small number of other aspectual verbs constitute
an exception to this statement.
Finally, the very general schemas for left-to-right parsing of surface
structures, described on page 8 and following, match the unraised structures
more closely than the raised structures, at least with respect to how clearly
underlying logical relations are represented in surface structure. Structures
which deviate from the schemas which fit many well-formed surface structures
are not necessarily ill-formed, but they do require more effort in processing.
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McCawley (1978) notes that a difference of "meaning" is perceived if
two structures are available in the language which communicate roughly the
same thing, as illustrated in (37) and (38):
(37a) Laura opened the door.
(b) The soot blackened the paper.
(38a) Laura caused the door to be/become open (and she's only 4 years
old).
(b) The soot caused the paper to become black.
(37a) and (b) suggest some indirect, non-ordinary means of causation. The
(38) sentences convey something different from the (37) sentences by virtue
of their apparent marked character, not because of hidden underlying abstract
meaning elements. There is some support for this notion, in that passive
sentences convey something different from their active counterparts, partic-
ularly if they are in any way unusual as passive sentences.
(39a) Fred sat on this chair.
(b) Napoleon drank from this cup.
(40a) This chair has been sat on by Fred.
(b) This cup was drunk from by Napoleon.
The sentences in (40) convey more strongly than (39) that (a) the chair is
materially affected, and (b) the cup is interesting or notable; this follows
from the unusual promotion of a prepositional object to subject, and from
the topic position of the derived subject (see Davison, 1980).
To return to the analogy of causative structures to raising structures,
one reason that I believe that the analogy is not justified is that to make
the analogy involves comparing two different kinds of surface structures.
Syntactic Complexity
37
In the case of Verb Raising, the embedded clause is wholly incorporated into
the higher clause, and loses its sentence boundaries. As Borkin ('Note 1)
shows, there is little or no evidence that clause union occurs in the case
of Raising. The internal sentence boundaries seem to persist, particularly
in the case of to complements. The initial and derived structures seem to
be as illustrated in (35) and (36). Note especially the differences between
(35b) and (36b).
Hence the structures which convey extra meaning by conversational
implicature will be (38a) and (b) (see McCawley, 1978, for discussion of direct
and indirect causation in English). The marked structure (35b) is also the
one which is the result of rule application under a very stringent set of
conditions. These are the necessary conditions summarized from Borkin
(Note 1.), which I have reinterpreted as conditions on topic NPs and reference
to specific events.
I now want to return to the questions raised in the first sections of
this paper: whether readability can be assessed for specific constructions,
in addition to randomly chosen sample passages for which an average is
computed; and whether the difficulty of a given construction is related in
a systematic way to other factors in the discourse. We have seen a certain
number of reasons for regarding raised structures as more difficult than
unraised structures. The internal relations are obscure; and the whole
compilation is well-formed under a set of not very clearly understood
conditions. But if this were the only thing to be said, I would not have
chosen this case to go on at great length about. I want to argue that the
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very factors which have caused linguists so much descriptive pain are
exactly the factors which define function of such sentences ih discourse.
That is, structures in which Raising has applied are indeed likely
to be difficult to interpret except if they are used in the optimal discourse
context. If the raised NP forms a "good" topic in that discourse, and if
the speaker wants to qualify the proposition it is in with some other predi-
cation giving the epistemic basis for the proposition, then the raised struc-
ture is the best way to do it. The structure itself has iconic properties;
that is, its structural properties can be regarded as expressive in themselves.
The raised NP is either in topic position or in another position in the higher
clause, separated from its clause of origin. Raising to Object moves the
subject of the lower clause into the object position occupied by the sub-
ordinate clause, as in (35a) and (b).
It is interesting to note that the output of Raising and the input more
or less to Verb Raising (cf. Aissen, 1974) are similar in structure, at
least if regarded as a string of constituents:
(41a) John caused the door to be/become open.
(b) John believed the door to be open.
Though one is the result of the non-application of Verb Raising (41a), and
the other is the result of the application of Raising, they are both marked
structures. Markedness should be determined by what contrasts are available.
In this case, the relevant contrasts are:
(42a) John caused the door to be open. (marked)
(b) John opened the door. (unmarked)
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(43a) John believed that the door was open. (unmarked)
(b) John believed the door to be open. (marked)
(42b) is much shorter and the information in it expressed much more compactly
than (42a). The grammatical relations in (42b) are clear, and there are
no internal clause boundaries. In (43a), the internal clause is clear
because it is marked by the complementizer that and the tensed verb. The
grammatical relations in each clause are marked by word order.
In (42a) and (43b), the grammatical role of the second NP is ambiguous,
and the clause boundaries of the internal clause are not explicitly marked.
The contrast with more transparent and straightforwardly marked structures
justifies calling the pair of sentence types in (41) above the marked members
of the contrasting pairs of related sentences. At the same time, the higher
clause is rendered less prominent than the lower clause. The higher clause
contains the epistemic modification of the proposition expressed in the
lower clause, which is often taken to be the "main" assertion in the sentence
at the expense of what is syntactically higher.
The raised structure is consistent with lowered prominence for the
higher clause. The lack of distinct markers of a full subordinate clause
and the fact that the subject or object in the higher clause is a member
of the lower clause also, suggest--or convey conversationally--that the
epistemic material is to be subordinated to the rest. Thus the raised struc-
ture does two discourse-related jobs at once, in an economical fashion by
comparison with alternative means:
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(44a) Scientists believe allergies to be partly of psychosomatic origin.
(b) Allergies are partly of psychosomatic origin, or so scientists
believe.
(c) Speaking of allergies, scientists believe that they are partly
of psychosomatic origin.
What.is conveyed separately by (44b) and (c) is conveyed at one fell swoop
by (44a)--that is, that allergies is the topic, and scientists' belief is the
basis for the assertion.
Conclusions
In preceding sections, I have reanalyzed the long list of conditions
and restrictions on what may be raised and out of what, into a small and
general specification, that is phrased in terms of topic and comment.
Raising, I have argued, is sensitive to pragmatic properties, such as what
kinds of reference to individuals is generally conveyed by a given type of
NP--as defined by its form, and by the discourse it occurs in. The condition
on the NP as "good" or actual topic is a necessary condition for Raising,
but not a sufficient one. I have not found anything to label a sufficient
condition in English. The special meaning associated with the raised version
is also compatible with the unraised version, though this does not seem to
be the case for Japanese (Tomoda, 1976-77). But the special meaning--first-
hand knowledge, predication directly about an individual, etc.--is conveyed
by the raised structure, to the exclusion of the neutral meaning which is
nevertheless entailed by it. I have accounted for this meaning as a case
of conversational implicature. It is conveyed by the choice of the "marked"
syntactic form, determined by the contrasts which the language permits.
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The set of necessary conditions and the generalized conversational
implicature together give raised structures some very particular though non-
syntactic properties. They make raised structures more restricted and
"difficult," but also more distinctive, and therefore exploitable for
expressive purposes.
Linguists are interested in how people acquire linguistic competence
and what this linguistic competence consists of--perhaps also how it mani-
fests itself in tasks in which language is crucially involved. Linguists
interested in syntax, such as myself, are interested in regularities of struc-
ture, in the formal mapping of one structure onto another, captured as
operations such as permutation, feature changing, and transformational rules
such as Passive, Adverb Preposing,-and Raising. But any extended serious
scrutiny of such matters will turn up unexpected conditions on rule operations,
aberrant cases wherean otherwise optional rule may not, or must apply, where
strange shades of meaning are attached to structures where there is no
explicit expression of such meaning.
One solution is to reject transformational rules entirely, in favor
of direct generation of the separate surface structures supposedly related
by a transformation, substituting interpretive conventions in its place,
or other means of accounting non-transformationally for facts about case-
marking and reference (cf. Chomsky & Lasnick, 1977, etc.). Another approach,
which turns out to be not much more illuminating than the previous one, is
to attach exception features and complex semantic material to constituents
in remote structure, which--in the case of the semantic material at least--
is never overtly realized in the derived structure. (See Green, 1974 ;
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Postal, 1974, for descriptions of some of the non-syntactic factors affecting
the application, and pp. 20-23 of this paper.)
I want to argue that there is another way. Linguistic ecologists
interested in clean-burning syntactic rules would want to do away with
such unpleasant smoggy emissions of rules as currently conceived of, in favor
of a fairly parsimonious syntax plus an improved understanding of how syn-
tactic structures are used to communicate meaning in discourse. That is,
not all meaning is to be considered a function of linguistic structure
alone, as extralinguistic conventions about language use may also play a
part, perhaps derived from the purposes to which language is put in the
(so-called) real world.
Linguistics and reading have not had a very close association, though
both disciplines have a common interest in how people process (comprehend,
produce) linguistic material. Lots of factors intervene in the teaching
of reading which are of little interest in themselves to linguists interested
in linguistic structures. In teaching reading, there are problems arising
from lack of shared cultural knowledge, reflecting majority/minority culture
differences, or class and cultural differences.
But if my account of Raising rules is correct--and I think such accounts
are plausible and deserve to be tested--and if such accounts can be articu-
lated in a way which is comprehensible outside the trade of linguistics, then
possibilities open for more challenging and effective reading materials. Once
the discourse functions of allegedly "difficult" constructions are better
understood, perhaps writers for younger readers will be bolder about using
them, in appropriate contexts adapted to their function. Greater variety
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of style, and the opportunity to handle more complex material in language,
would be the result. In trying to find such solutions, the goal of both
linguistics and the teaching of reading would be better served.
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Footnotes
The research reported in this paper was partially supported by the
National Institute of Education Contract No. US-NIE-C-400-76-0116. I
would like to thank students in Linguistics 403(c) at the University of
Illinois, Fall 1978, for discussion of an earlier form of part of this
paper, and Robbie Kantor, Georgia Green, Anne Roalef, Jean Hannah, and
Bill Nagy for helpful criticism of this version. They are responsible
only for improvements, however. Lectures by Jerry Morgan, February 5 and 6,
1979 have been very helpful to me in formulating this analysis. Morgan
proposes a distinction between linguistic facts and purposes for which
linguistic structures may be used in discourse.
It is foolhardy to lay out categorical definitions of topic, which
i do not consider a semantic or syntactic category. But here I am assuming
that preverbal subject position in English is associated with the topic of
a sentence; that each sentence has one topic, though it may not be clearly
definable for every sentence, and that the topic NP of a sentence is
related to what is clearly perceived as the general topic of the discourse
in the context of which the sentence is uttered.
2The syntactic details are grossly simplified here.
Generic NPs which are not anaphoric are of middling acceptability in
raised structures:
(i) We believe that mules are hybrids.
(ii) ?We believe mules to be hybrids.
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Know allows raising, but it is not always used factively.
Main clause phenomena tend not to occur in factive structures.
6 I follow some of the discussion in Steever, 1977, very closely, but
not all of it.
Though Clause Union and Verb Raising have not applied, the NP
subject of the lower clause has been raised.
McCawley (1978) notes that there is a difference in the interpretation
of causatives in just the cases where there is a difference between a single
verb, such as open, and a periphrastic expression such as cause to be(come)
open; the single word is neutral and the periphrastic form conversationally
implies indirect causation. Where there is no lexical form which encode
causation and some other predicate, then the periphrastic form is used,
e.g., cause to drop one's parcels (ibid). The periphrastic form conveys
no special notions of indirect causation where there is no contrast of form
possible.
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